




Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Appellate Arena
David B. Wexler*
As part of this Symposium, the Seattle University Law Review is
engaging in an exciting undertaking: the beginning of a dialogue
about the use of therapeutic jurisprudence in the appellate courts.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is a perspective that focuses on the impact
of the law on emotional life and psychological well-being.' It
examines how the law-which consists of legal rules, legal procedures,
and the behavior and roles of legal actors-often produces therapeutic
or antitherapeutic outcomes.2
Therapeutic jurisprudence originated within the core content
area of mental health law.3 Its broader application was apparent virtu-
ally from the beginning,4 and the approach quickly expanded from a
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1. See Introduction to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE xvii (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) [hereinafter LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY]. The website for the International Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
which includes a cumulative bibliography, is located at <http://www.law.arizona.edu/upr-intj>.
2. See id.
3. See THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David
B. Wexler ed., 1990).
4. See DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRU-
DENCE x (1991). It seems only natural (at least to those of us who specialize in mental health
law) that initial forays into therapeutic jurisprudence took place within the core content areas of
mental health law. Obviously, however, therapeutic jurisprudence also has applications in foren-
sic psychiatry generally, in health law, in a variety of allied legal fields (criminal law, juvenile
law, family law), and probably across the entire legal spectrum.
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new perspective on mental health law to a mental health or therapeutic
perspective on the law in general.5 Recently, the area of therapeutic
jurisprudence has begun to reach beyond academic circles and into the
world of legal practice.' Of particular note has been the increasing
interest of the judiciary, both as consumers and as producers of thera-
peutic jurisprudence literature and insights!
In fact, therapeutic jurisprudence was the topic of the May 2000
midyear meeting of the American Judges Association; the association
devoted a full issue of its official journal, Court Review, to the topic.
8
To date, judicial interest has concentrated on courts of first impres-
sion--drug treatment courts,9 domestic violence courts,1° criminal
courts,1 and juvenile and family courts. 12  Two pieces in Court
Review, however, raise the issue of therapeutic jurisprudence at the
appellate level: an article by Professor Nathalie Des Rosiers of the law
faculty of the University of Western Ontario, 3 and a brief comment
by Professor Amy Ronner, a law professor and former director of the
in-house appellate clinic at St. Thomas University in Miami, Flor-
ida.14 Professor Des Rosiers launches her article with a discussion of
the 1998 opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ref Re Secession
of Quebec.'5 (Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the discus-
sion of the appellate process is actually sparked by a case involving the
Supreme Court of Canada's original jurisdiction.)
5. See LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 1, at xvii.
6. See generally PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000); Marc W. Patry et al., Better Legal Counseling
Through Empirical Research: Identifying Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strategies, 34 CAL. W. L.
REV. 439 (1998); David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Theory
to Practice, 68 REVISTA JURIDICA U.P.R. 691 (1991); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence and the Culture of Critique, 10 J. CONT. LEGAL ISSUES 263 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treat-
ment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and
Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999).
8. See CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 4 et. seq.
9. See WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 4.
10. See Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic Violence Court:
Combat in the Trenches, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 28; Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Spe-
cialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1285 (2000).
11. See Judge Robert J. Kane, A Sentencing Model for the 21st Century, in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 1, at 203.
12. See Hon. William J. O'Neil & Hon. Barry C. Schneider, Recommendations of the Com-
mittee to Study Family Law Issues in the Arizona Superior Court: A Family Court System, 37
FAMILY & CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 179 (1999).
13. Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A Therapeutic Analysis of the Role of
Courts in Minority-Majority Conflicts, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 54.
14. Amy D. Ronner, Therapeutic Jurisprudence on Appeal, CT. REV., Spring 2000, at 64.
15. Ref. Re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217 (1998).
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In this Introduction, I will briefly summarize Des Rosiers' Court
Review article, entitled From Telling to Listening: A Therapeutic Analy-
sis of the Role of Courts in Minority-Majority Conflicts, 6 placing it in a
framework that transcends minority-majority conflicts and encourages
discussion regarding the use of therapeutic jurisprudence by appellate
tribunals. My brief summary is followed by a series of comments that
have the potential of launching a refreshing line of inquiry into the
appellate process, opinion writing, and the formulation of legal
doctrine.
I.
Even though there was no immediate plan for a referendum
regarding the independence of Quebec, the Canadian federal govern-
ment, exercising its power to refer questions to the Canadian Supreme
Court, asked the Court to rule on the constitutionality of a possible
future unilateral Quebec secession. The Court held that Quebec did
not have the right to unilaterally secede, but it nonetheless stated that
a "clear" majority vote in Quebec on a "clear" question favoring seces-
sion "would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative
which all of the other participants in the Confederation would have to
recognize."17
Des Rosiers notes that both separatists and federalists applauded
the Supreme Court decision."i Using a therapeutic jurisprudence
framework, she attempts to explain the favorable reaction. Basically,
Des Rosiers claims that the members of the Canadian Supreme Court
moved away from their past stance as "tellers of the truth,"19 becom-
ing "more process-oriented listeners, translators, educators, and, if
possible, facilitators."20 She notes the therapeutic value of process--of
telling one's story and being heard-and of a procedure that values the
ongoing, continuous relationship between the parties. 2' And, of
course, she notes the sensitive use of language by the court.22 Finally,
she commends the Canadian Supreme Court's doctrinal solution-the
imposition of an "obligation to negotiate.
23
16. Des Rosiers, supra note 13.
17. Ref. Re Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217 at 150.
18. See Des Rosiers, supra note 10, at 54.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 57. See also Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests
of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79 (1997) (examining the conven-
tional legal paradigm, its operation in the context of child protection and custody matters).
22. Des Rosiers, supra note 13, at 62.
23. Id.
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II.
In these brief introductory remarks, I cannot even attempt to
capture the nuances and texture of the case or Professor Des Rosiers'
analysis. Those writings clearly deserve to be read in full.
Instead, I will race to Des Rosiers' conclusion, and, through my
own italics, try to set the stage for the commentaries that follow:
It is true that it is easier for a court to be "therapeutic" when the
case presented is "hypothetical", as the Secession Reference was.
However, there is still a lesson to be learned in the approach
adopted by the Supreme Court. Its attention to the language it
used in order not to create a problem of legitimacy for itself in
Quebec has been fruitful. Particularly welcome is the process-
driven solution it offered, which called for respect for other
minorities and defined the values which had to be taken into
account.
It could be that an inventory of process-driven solutions ought to be
offered to courts. The imposition of an obligation to negotiate, as
was done here, is one example. The creation of duties to con-
sult, as was done in the Aboriginal context, may also be of value.
Several mechanisms that exist in other fields, the obligation to
negotiate in good faith in labor law or the obligation to inform in
tort law, for example, could be explored. More must be done in
this area. It could also be that lawyering will have to be done
differently: if the process is to have the therapeutic benefits
argued for, it requires that the "true" story be told, that the
groups' narratives be heard. It may require that lawyers relin-
quish control of the story told by the group-client. Again, the
implications for lawyers of a judicial therapeutic approach will
have to be examined further.
24
Des Rosiers' first point is structural: she posits a therapeutic
advantage to the "hypothetical" nature of the case. 2' Does the ability
to issue advisory opinions enhance a court's ability to create "thera-
peutic" doctrines? Surely, this issue warrants discussion. Interest-
ingly, Des Rosiers notes that asking the unilateral secession question
in the absence of an immediate plan for another referendum was risky
and "angered most Qub&cois. ' ' 26 Might a "reference power" judicial
structure possibly have antitherapeutic pre-decision consequences and
therapeutic post-decision consequences?
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. Seeid.atSS.
26. Id. at 54.
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Next, Des Rosiers speaks of language use, and elsewhere she
speaks of opinion-writing as writing a "letter to the loser., 27 If past
opinions are read through this prism, we are likely to find admirable,
abominable, and average illustrations. It may be useful to collect,
classify, and use these illustrations in educational programs for judges,
lawyers, and law students.
Des Rosiers is very much taken with the "obligation to negoti-
ate" or, as she terms it, the "process-driven solution ' 21 shaped by the
Supreme Court of Canada. In fact, she cites similar doctrinal devices
found in labor and tort law, and makes the intriguing suggestion that
"an inventory of process-driven solutions ought to be offered to the
courts."29 We should indeed seek to collect examples from existing
law (in various legal regimes), and perhaps begin to propose still other
solutions.
In this connection, I have long been impressed with:
the Warren Court's invitation, apparently never accepted by
policymakers or scholars, to think through the true bases of
Miranda and the line-up cases. Recall that the Miranda Court
required specific warnings and waivers, including advice regard-
ing appointed counsel during interrogation, "unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exer-
cise it .... With lineups, the Court's right to counsel was not
intended as a "constitutional straightjacket." "Legislative or
other regulations ... which eliminate the risks of abuse and
unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impedi-
ments to meaningful confrontation at trial may ... remove the
basis for regarding the stage as 'critical.'
30
The United States Supreme Court accomplished much in Miran-
da by not creating a constitutional straightjacket. The Court took
some of the sting out of its rulings by allowing critics to consider and
propose alternative options for satisfying the interests at stake and by
allowing itself enough breathing space to turn back and take a differ-
ent approach in the future if its ruling did not work well in the real
world.
By and large, dialogue-producing doctrines are likely to be help-
ful. Such doctrines may, in and of themselves, actually constitute the
27. Id. at 56.
28. Id. at 62.
29. Id.
30. David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 1, at 713, 720.
2000]
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corpus of an emerging therapeutic and preventive law.3" In some
instances, however, courts may eventually need to call a halt to endless
and unproductive dialogue. When might that be the case? How
might it best be accomplished?
Des Rosiers' conclusion notes that, in some instances, perhaps
"lawyering will have to be done differently,"32 perhaps by giving more
room to clients or group-clients to tell their own stories. Professor
Amy Ronner's Court Review article, Therapeutic Jurisprudence on
Appeal,33 a companion piece to Des Rosiers', deals in part with the
potential therapeutic impact of appellate attorney/client interaction.
The role of the appellate lawyer may be profitably viewed through the
therapeutic jurisprudence lens.
These are some of the many issues that can be healthy and
appetizing food for thought in a therapeutic jurisprudence appellate
project. Such a project should, of course, be ongoing, but it will surely
be given shape and direction by the rich commentary that follows.
31. In his foreword to Lawyering Through Life: The Origin of Preventive Law, Professor
Dauer writes:
Nearly thirty years ago Hans Kelsen (the founder of the "Pure Theory of Law" school
of jurisprudence) wrote to Louis Brown. "The term 'Preventive Law' is in my opin-
ion not correct," Kelsen suggested. "It is not the law which is preventive, it is the
activity of the professional lawyer who recommends to his client an action (or the
abstention from an action) by which the client may avoid legal effects not in is inter-
est." Louis Brown devoted the next three decades-in his writing, in his teaching, in
his life as a professional lawyer-as if proving the truth of Kelsen's correction.
Edward Dauer, Foreword in Louis M. BROWN, LAWYERING THROUGH LIFE: THE ORIGIN
OF PREVENTIVE LAW at xv (1986).
A corpus of process-oriented legal doctrines enables us to begin considering whether the law
itself may indeed sometimes be preventive. The law can surely be "preventive" in a therapeutic
jurisprudence sense-discouraging stressful, aggressive encounters and encouraging harmonious
interactions. And to the extent that such harmony reduces the likelihood of future legal conflict
and resort to litigation, the law would presumably operate "preventively" even in the narrower
(more legally-tailored) preventive law sense of the term.
32. Des Rosiers, supra note 13, at 62.
33. Ronner, supra note 14, at 64.
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